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God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism, by William Lane
Craig. Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 241. $80 (hardcover).
MARY LENG, University of York
Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics is the view that there are abstract mathematical objects, such as the number 2. “Abstract,” here, is most
often characterized by the “way of negation” (John P. Burgess and Gideon
Rosen, A Subject with no Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of
Mathematics [Clarendon Press, 1997], 17), as applying to non-spatiotemporal, acausal, mind- and language-independent objects. The main motivation
for thinking that there are mathematical objects is that many mathematical claims that we take to be literally true seem to imply the existence of
such things (for example, the claim that “There is an even prime number”
seems to imply that there is at least one mathematical object). The main
motivation for thinking that these objects are abstract, as negatively characterized above, is that no account in terms of the obvious positive features
seems to work. It is hard to see how the number 2 could be thought of as
a spatiotemporally located object entering into causal relations, and, given
the finiteness of human minds and the plausible thought that even before
humans were on the scene to think or talk about such things, “when two
dinosaurs met two dinosaurs there were four dinosaurs” (Martin Gardner, “Is Mathematics for Real?,” New York Review of Books 28 [1981], 13), it
is also hard to see how mathematical objects, such as numbers, could be
dependent for their existence on human minds or languages. Mathematical truths are standardly held to be true of necessity and eternally, so the
objects they concern should likewise exist of necessity and eternally.
However, the Platonist account of mathematical objects faces a serious
obstacle. Precisely because of their negative characterization, it is hard for
the Platonist to give a positive account of how we can come to know truths
about abstract objects. Given their acausal, nonspatiotemporal, mind- and
language-independent nature, what reason have we for thinking that our
beliefs about abstract mathematical objects get things right about their nature? This is the key epistemological challenge to Platonism, first raised by
Paul Benacerraf (“Mathematical Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 70 [1973]: 661–
680), with focus on the presumed acausal nature of mathematical objects as
abstracta in light of the then-dominant causal theory of knowledge, and
then refined by Hartry Field (Realism, Mathematics and Modality [Blackwell,
1989]) as the challenge to explain how, given the Platonist’s account of the
nature of abstract objects, it is reasonable for them to expect our mathematical beliefs reliably to reflect how things are with such objects.
In his extremely thought-provoking discussion of God and abstract objects, God Over All, William Lane Craig is concerned with another problem
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raised by the Platonist account of mathematical objects, along with other
purported abstracta such as properties and propositions, by virtue of their
status as abstract objects: the challenge to divine aseity. (The book, an expansion of Craig’s 2015 Cadbury Lectures, is a taster for his forthcoming
God and Abstract Objects [Springer-Verlag], which Craig explains offers “a
more extensive, in-depth discussion of the questions and views treated” in
God over All [viii].) According to the Judaeo-Christian concept of God, God
depends on no other being for His existence, whereas all other things that
exist depend for their existence on God. If there are abstract objects, such
as numbers, then they present a challenge to this account of the nature of
reality. For, as Craig points out, “insofar as these abstract objects are taken
to be uncreated, necessary, and eternal” (3), this puts them in conflict with
the doctrine of divine aseity. As such, mathematical objects, as abstracta
present a prima facie challenge to Judaeo-Christian theism, as do other
purported abstracta (such as, for example, propositions or properties).
Is there room, then, for philosophers of religion concerned with the
challenge to divine aseity, and philosophers of mathematics concerned
with the problem of explaining our knowledge of mathematical objects
as abstracta, to join forces in rejecting these problematic objects? That
is Craig’s hope. In particular, in God Over All, Craig looks to contemporary defences of nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics to argue
for the plausibility of avoiding the challenge to divine aseity by denying
the existence of abstract objects. We will consider Craig’s attempt to put
so-called “easy road” nominalist challenges to mathematical Platonism to
the service of the theist in a moment. But first, some thoughts about the
alternative options for the theist, which Craig considers and sets aside in
his book.
In outlining the motivation for mathematical Platonism, above, I said
that the characterization of mathematical objects as abstract via the “way
of negation” had come about through the implausibility of characterizing
such objects via any of the positive characteristics listed: spatiotemporal,
causal, mental, linguistic. Consider in particular the thought that mathematical objects could be accounted for as mental objects. Constructivists
in the philosophy of mathematics, such as L. E. J. Brouwer (“Consciousness, Philosophy, and Mathematics,” [1948], extracted in Paul Benacerraf
and Hilary Putnam, Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings [1983],
90–96), attempted to account for mathematical objects as human mental
constructions, but although the constructivist programme brought with
it some interesting new branches of mathematics, it places strong limitations on what is to count as acceptable mathematics, based on its account
of what is constructible-in-principle by the human intellect. More broadly,
Gottlob Frege (The Foundations of Arithmetic [1888], trans. J. L. Austin,
2nd ed [Blackwell, 1953], 38) mocked as “weird and wonderful . . . the
results of taking seriously the suggestion that number is an idea,” noting
that if the number 2 is an idea in someone’s head then there would be no
unique number 2, but just my 2, your 2, and ever more number 2s coming
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into existence with each new generation of thinkers. But these objections
depend on taking mathematical objects to be ideas in human minds. As
Craig notes, if we bring a theistic outlook to the question of the nature of
mathematical objects, the idea of mathematical objects as mental objects
has more plausibility (72). If mathematical objects are ideas in God’s mind,
as suggested by the doctrine of divine conceptualism, then they are not subject to the same limitations of human finite and temporally constrained
existence. And with only one God, we can make sense of their uniqueness
too. Furthermore, a theistic outlook may help to answer the epistemological objection to Platonism: perhaps God is the origin of our ideas of abstract objects such as numbers (something of this thought is present in
Mark Steiner’s discussion of the puzzle of the applicability of mathematics
[The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem (Harvard University Press, 1998)]). The combination of realism about mathematical objects
with theism (either by accounting for mathematical objects, as the divine
conceptualist does, as ideas in God’s mind, or alternatively, as proposed by
the abstract creationist, accounting for them as created abstracta), looks at
least initially promising.
In chapters 4 and 5, Craig outlines a number of objections to abstract
creationism and divine conceptualism, but in each case the most significant
challenge seems to be a form of the bootstrapping objection. This objection
arises because it is assumed that, amongst the purported abstract objects
created by God, are properties. But, since “in order to create properties, God
would already have to possess certain properties” (60), we appear to be
stuck in an explanatory circle. To avoid this objection, Craig suggests that
the only live option is to reject what he calls “the Platonistic ontological
assay of things” (68), according to which there are properties and substances which exemplify those properties. But to drop the Platonic account
of properties as “fundamental ontological constituents of things” (68)
would be, Craig claims, to lose “any rationale for positing the existence—in
a metaphysically heavy sense—of such objects” (68), thus undermining the
motivation for accounting for abstracta as God’s creations in the first place.
And without this motivation in place, neither divine conceptualism nor
abstract creationism are required—we can instead move straight to nominalist attempts to do without abstracta altogether.
This move of Craig’s is, however, altogether too quick, and an apparent
result of lumping together all purported abstracta (in this case, specifically,
mathematical objects as abstract particulars, and properties as abstract
universals) under one umbrella. The motivation for a Platonic account of
properties as abstracta may well be the “Platonistic ontological assay of
things,” according to which properties must exist metaphysically prior
to being exemplified in substances. But the primary motivation for mathematical Platonism is entirely separate from the motivation for Platonism
over nominalism as an account of universals, residing in an account of
the semantics of claims that we take to be uncontroversially true. Abandon a Platonistic account of properties as universals, and the problem of
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the apparent necessity of positing mathematical objects such as numbers
as abstract particulars remains. But if we drop the Platonistic account of
universals, the bootstrapping objection no longer threatens an account of
mathematical objects as either created abstracta or divine concepts. Furthermore, the abandonment of the so-called “Platonistic ontological assay
of things” as provided by the Platonistic account of universals may actually require that we hold on to mathematical objects as abstract particulars.
Thus, for example, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra’s defence of resemblance
nominalism (Resemblance Nominalism: A solution to the Problem of Universals
[Clarendon Press, 2002]) offers a nominalist account of universals as sets of
resembling particulars, and so, at least on the face of it, requires acceptance
of the existence of sets as abstract particulars. A rejection of the traditional
Platonist’s abstract universals, coupled with the acceptance of realism
about mathematical objects (as either abstract particulars or divine ideas)
is perhaps better motivated than Craig suggests.
So it seems that, if we reject the Platonistic account of universals, realism about mathematical objects as God’s creations may be pursued by the
theist either via a defence of divine conceptualism or of absolute creationism. But ought we be realists about mathematical objects? In the second
half of his book Craig considers a version of the standard philosophical
argument in favour of realism about mathematical objects—the so-called
indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism—and (appealing
to a number of recent anti-Platonist responses to this argument) finds it
wanting. It is here where I must declare an interest, as a defender of one
such response (Leng, Mathematics and Reality [Oxford University Press,
2010]). So although as the above considerations indicate, I suspect that,
if we had reason to accept the existence of mathematical objects, then this
would not be fatal to the standard doctrine of divine aseity (since divine
conceptualism and abstract creationism remain in play), nevertheless, I
am broadly in agreement with Craig that the indispensability argument
for the existence of mathematical objects can be resisted, so that we do
not have reason to accept the existence of mathematical objects. The core
of the response I favour is that offered by those who have come to be
known (following Colyvan, “There is no easy road to nominalism,” Mind
119 [2010]: 285–306) as “easy road” nominalists. Such nominalists argue
that, while quantification over mathematical objects may turn out to be
indispensable to our best scientific theories, nevertheless our continued
reliance on such theories does not commit us to believe in the existence of
mathematical objects, since it is plausible that what accounts for the success of our scientific theories is not that those theories are literally true, but
that they are nominalistically adequate. If we think of an empirical scientific
theory as a body of claims apparently relating “abstract” mathematical
objects to “concrete” physical things, the claim that empirical science is
nominalistically adequate is roughly, as Mark Balaguer puts is, the claim
that “the physical world holds up its end of the ‘empirical science bargain’” (Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics [Oxford University
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Press, 1998], 134)—that is, in all physical respects things are the way they
would have to be for our theory to be true.
Craig’s discussion of such nominalist responses to the indispensability
argument is at once intriguing and frustrating. Intriguing because, as a
relative outsider to this debate, his focus is on issues that are often brushed
aside in the philosophy of mathematics literature. Chapter 8, for example,
includes an extended discussion of the question of whether fictionalism
is self-defeating, raising the question of what attitude fictionalists should
take to “useful fictions” themselves (an interesting issue, though one that I
think the fictionalist has the resources to solve). Frustrating because, again
as a relative outsider to the debate, Craig mischaracterizes a number of the
key issues in a way that skews his response to some of the standard easy
road positions. Most problematic in this regard is Craig’s presentation of
the indispensability argument itself, which he takes from Mark Balaguer’s
(2009) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “Platonism in Metaphysics.” The argument quoted is certainly not what is standardly taken
to be the indispensability argument for Platonism, and a quick check of
the Stanford entry shows why: the argument quoted is what Balaguer calls
“the singular term argument,” which he says originates with Plato but is
first clearly formulated by Frege. The argument is roughly the one given
at the start of this review: that there are literally true sentences whose
truth would require the existence of abstract (mathematical) objects, so we
should conclude that such objects would exist.
Craig singles Balaguer’s “singular term argument” out for discussion
apparently because to his mind it presents the key issues at work in the
indispensability argument for Platonism “free of Quine’s more controversial theses” (45). But this isn’t the indispensability argument. In particular,
the indispensability argument contains two key features that are not present here. First is a justification for taking some claims about mathematical
objects as literally true: this is because some such claims are indispensable
in formulating our best empirical-scientific theories, and (according to the
Quinean picture) we are committed to accepting those theories as true at
least until something better comes along. Second is a focus on indispensable existential quantification over mathematical objects in our theories,
rather than on the use of singular terms apparently referring to mathematical objects. Here, Quine is well aware that we may sometimes use
singular terms to speak “as if” they refer to objects, without really being
committed to the existence of such objects. The test, for Quine, for genuine commitment is whether we are willing—in our most serious, literal,
moments, i.e., in our tidied up versions of our best scientific theories—to
“quantify in,” moving from, e.g., Fa to ∃ x F x. For Quine, the use of the
existential quantifier in contexts where we take ourselves to be speaking literally is the indicator of ontological commitment. If science (whose
claims must be taken seriously), in its most careful moments requires existential quantification over mathematical objects, then we ought to accept
the existence of such objects.
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The reason I bring this up is that much of Craig’s discussion of “the indispensability argument” is focussed on rejecting the Quinean account of
ontological commitment, and here much attention is paid to examples of
uses of non-denoting singular terms in sentences that are plausibly taken
to be literally true. Craig suggests that, rather than taking singular terms
as automatically referring, we could adopt a positive free logic and allow
for claims using mathematical singular terms to be literally true. This is
the approach Craig favours, as he thinks it is implausible to claim (as I
have done, much to Craig’s amusement (149)!) that, since “2” and “4” do
not refer, “2 + 2 = 4” is not literally true. But, even if we allow Craig the
use of a positive free logic and thus the literal truth of unquantified claims
of arithmetic such as that “2 + 2 = 4,” there remains the issue that in empirical science we do not restrict ourselves to unquantified arithmetic; we
also quantify in. In positive free logic, the use of the existential quantifier
is taken to indicate ontological commitment, so even if the unquantified
claims of elementary arithmetic can be literally true without requiring the
existence of mathematical objects, the mathematical claims used in empirical science still does seemingly require the existence of such objects.
A further move, considered by Craig, would be to follow Jody Azzouni
(Talking about Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations, and Fictions [Oxford University Press, 2010]) in denying that even the existential quantifier is
indicative of ontological commitment. Craig has some sympathies towards this position, but ultimately pulls back from endorsing Azzouni’s
view wholesale. Instead, following Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the
World [Oxford University Press, 2011]), he claims that, while most ordinary uses of the existential quantifier are not ontologically committing,
we can introduce a new language, Ontologese, whose quantifiers are stipulated as indicative of ontological commitments, and argues that we should
use this language when we are presenting our most serious metaphysical
claims about the nature of reality. Craig thus endorses a positive free logic
as the proper logic of Ontologese, suggesting that when we are presenting
our most serious metaphysical account of reality existential quantifiers,
but not singular terms, should be read as indicative of commitment to the
existence of objects.
Again, this is all very well and good, but, in light of the Quinean theses
mentioned above, this makes clear how close Craig’s position on ontological commitment is, in fact, to Quine’s. In both cases, it is existential quantification, rather than the mere use of singular terms, that is indicative
of genuine ontological commitment, and, in both cases, even existential
quantifiers are only indicative of genuine ontological commitment when
we are speaking seriously and literally about ontological matters. All Quine adds
to this is the claim that empirical science (rather than, e.g., the metaphysics
classroom) provides the context where we speak seriously and literally
about ontological matters: if we are aiming to carve nature at its joints,
Quine says we can do no better than trust what our scientific theories say
about how to do so.
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Despite, then, Craig’s efforts to challenge the Quinean account of ontological commitment assumed by myself and others in the debate over
the indispensability argument, what is really required for his response to
Quine to work is for him either to show that we can dispense with quantification over mathematical objects in our best scientific theories (this is
Field’s hard road to nominalism; Science without Numbers [Princeton, 1980]),
or to make plausible the claim that we need not—and ought not—take
seriously all the claims of even our best scientific theories (this is the easy
road offered, in various ways, by myself, Jody Azzouni [Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism (Oxford University Press, 2004),
Mark Balaguer, [Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics]; Stephen
Yablo [“The Myth of the Seven,” in Mark Eli Kalderon, ed., Fictionalism in
Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2005), 88–115], and others). Craig
throws himself in with the easy road camp, and of course I am with him in
thinking that this approach can be made to work, but again lack of engagement with the Quinean case for taking empirical science as the arena in
which ontological matters are settled means that some of Craig’s defences
of the “easy road” approaches seem beside the point. Thus, for example,
chapter 10 includes a very nice discussion of features of pure mathematics
that make it apt for a ‘make-believe’ account, but the Quinean could concede all of that and argue that nevertheless, once mathematical theories
make their way into empirical science, they get confirmed as literally true.
Even as a reader whose sympathies lie firmly with easy road nominalism, then, I was left with the feeling that, while Craig’s thinking is along
the right lines in endorsing a nominalist approach in the philosophy of
mathematics, nevertheless he has not quite appreciated the strength of the
case against.
In relation to the case against nominalism, I would like finally to note a
feature of nominalist approaches in the philosophy of mathematics, both
in the “easy road” and the “hard road” camp, that is overlooked by Craig,
and that has led some to question how much is actually gained by the
nominalist rejection of the Platonist’s abstract objects. In almost all cases
(with, perhaps, Weir (Truth through Proof [Oxford University Press, 2010])
as a notable exception), nominalists in the philosophy of mathematics
propose to do without abstract mathematical objects by means of a trade
of ontology for modality. Thus, for fictionalists both of the easy road and
hard road stripe, what is fictional in a given pure mathematical theory is
its axioms and their logical consequences. And again, in the case of applied mathematics, the nominalistic adequacy of a mathematically-stated
empirical theory is a matter of it being consistent with any nominalistic
facts, and thus logically implying no false nominalistic claims. Indeed,
Craig’s concern about the potential “self-defeating” nature of fictionalism
is answerable once we introduce a modal element (Craig touches on this
when he suggests that “reference to stories, theories, models, and the like”
can be dispensed with in the fictionalist account in favour of “counterfactual claims about what mathematical entities would be like were they
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to exist” [165]). Acceptance of primitive modal facts about logical consequence allows the fictionalist to make good on such “counterfactuals”:
they are, strictly, claims about what follows logically from the assumption
that there are objects satisfying a given theory’s axioms. Fictionalist (and
related nominalist) accounts in the philosophy of mathematics are heavily reliant on the assumption that there are primitive (unreduced) modal
facts about what follows from what, and that we can come to know some
such facts.
In the context of the philosophy of mathematics, where the standard
challenge for Platonism is the “knowledge problem,” those in the Platonist
camp may reasonably question whether anything has been achieved by
this attempt to do away with a problematic ontology by trading ontology
for modality. By introducing primitive modal facts, perhaps the nominalist
has just replaced one mystery (how we can come to know abstract objects)
with another (how we can come to know facts about what follows from
what)? On the other hand, the Platonist will claim, if we equip ourselves
with abstract mathematical objects, then we can do away with mysterious primitive modal facts. Once we have the set theoretic universe, then
model theory provides us with a reductive account of modal truths as
truths about set theoretic models (though see Shalkowski [“The Ontological Ground of the Alethic Modality,” The Philosophical Review103 (1994):
669–688] for a dissenting voice about the prospects of reductive accounts
of modality). If we shift this debate to the philosophy of religion, analogous worries may appear relating to Craig’s attempt to bypass the challenge to divine aseity by doing away with abstract objects. If the rejection
of abstract objects requires the acceptance of primitive modal facts, then
one wonders whether the challenge of divine aseity is avoided only at the
cost of reintroducing the challenge of divine sovereignty.
Craig takes pains in chapter 4 to distinguish between Platonism’s challenge to divine aseity and its challenge to divine sovereignty, while noting
that the two are often run together. Craig’s interest is in the challenge to
divine aseity, so he largely sets the sovereignty issue aside. But the substantial modal assumptions made by nominalists in the hope of avoiding
abstracta bring the challenge of divine sovereignty to front of stage. If the
rejection of abstract objects requires the acceptance of primitive modal
facts governing what would have to be true were there objects satisfying our mathematical axioms, then the question arises as to whether God
has sovereignty over these facts. This is not to say that the challenge of
modal facts to divine sovereignty is as pressing as the challenge of abstract
objects to divine aseity, but just to note that the nominalist proposal to
do away with abstract objects in the philosophy of mathematics does not
come for free, and that the resulting modal commitments may bring with
them problems of their own. Despite Craig’s best efforts to avoid the issue
of divine sovereignty in this book, then, the completion of his proposed
solution to the problem of divine aseity may well require some with substantial further work to be done on this topic.

